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One of the marvels of early Wisconsin was the Round
River, a river that flowed into itself, and thus sped
around and around in a never-ending circuit. Paul
Bunyan discovered it, and the Bunyan saga tells how he
floated many a log down its restless waters.
No one has suspected Paul of speaking in parables,
yet in this instance he did. Wisconsin not only had a
round river, Wisconsin is one. The current is the stream
of energy which flows out of the soil into plants, thence
into animals, thence back into the soil in a never ending
circuit of life.'
I. INTRODUCTION
T HAT the earth and all of its land flows in a never ending cir-
cuit like the Round River is a fact beginning to dawn on the
human community. In the United States, land has historically
been viewed as both an economic commodity and factor of pro-
duction.2 Land is also a natural resource, finite and essential.
Life on the planet cannot exist without healthy land, air and
water. One can survive without oil, coal, television, plastics and
fast food, but not without healthy land, air and water systems. We
can make value choices to have television or fast food, but it is
imperative that relatively clean land, air and water continue to
exist.
An impediment to viewing land as an interconnected natural
resource is the modern attitude that perceives land solely as an
economic entity. The attitude that land is a commodity to be
bought, sold and developed to enhance the individual wealth of
landowners ignores the essential characteristic of land as a natural
resource. This attitude is fostered by the constitutional interpre-
tations made by some courts, especially the United States
Supreme Court, which determines land use issues from a single
perspective-economic.a By the nature of their operation within
1. A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COuNTY ALMANAC 188 (1949).
2. See generally id. at 237-64. Leopold indicates that an intrinsic problem of
viewing land as an economic commodity is that most parts of the "land commu-
nity" have no economic value. Id. at 246. As he explains, when we find a non-
economic part of that community threatened, we exacerbate the problem by in-
venting a subterfuge to give it economic importance. Id. at 247. Such an ap-
proach is self-destructing. Id.
3. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In
determining when governmental regulatory action constitutes a "taking" of
property, the Court stated, "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
2
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the governmental system, courts decide matters through a case by
case analysis; therefore, land use law is in some measure made on
a parcel-by-parcel basis. This procedure of deciding cases solely
from an economic perspective, and on a parcel-by-parcel basis, is
the antithesis of what needs to be done regarding a resource that
forms the base of our natural systems pyramid. 4
Despite the enlightened decisions of some of the state
courts,5 land use decisions are too important to be left to the ad
hoc decisionmaking of courts. A comprehensive legislative system
must be developed to maximize the protection of lands that play
an important natural resource role and to minimize landowner
misery by creating rules that may not be ideal from the owner's
perspective but are known and predictable. The validity of any
regulatory system, however, must, in the end, be affirmed by the
courts.
Any regulatory scheme must clear several major hurdles in
court. A state regulation must first constitute a valid exercise of
the police power. To meet this requirement, the regulation must
have a legitimate public health, safety or welfare purpose, and
that purpose must be reasonably promoted by the regulatory
scheme. 6 In addition, the courts insist that the otherwise valid
exercise of the police power not unduly burden individual prop-
erty owners. 7 These so-called police power elements essentially
amount to a substantive due process analysis,8 thereby bringing
us to the constitutional hurdles.
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations" are among the "several factors that
have particular significance." Id. at 124.
4. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Callfor Judicial Protection of the
Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311,
358-59 (1988).
5. E.g., Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287, 292 (N.H.
1984) (stating that where land, such as wetlands, has public importance, land
may be unavailable for development); Responsible Citizens in Opposition to the
Flood Plain Ordinance v. City of Asheville, 302 S.E.2d 204, 210 (N.C. 1983)
(stating that landowner may be prohibited from new construction which inter-
feres with flood control role land plays); County of Pine v. Dep't of Natural Re-
sources, 280 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn. 1979) (stating position that land must be
viewed more interdependently);Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201
N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972) (noting that owner has no absolute power to change
essential natural character of land for purposes for which land is unsuited).
6. LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 73-79 (B. Blaesser and A. Weinstein
ed. 1989) [hereinafter LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION].
7. Id. at 76-77.
8. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). The Court explained that
for a state's exercise of its police power to be justified, it must appear that the
interests of the public as a whole require such interference. Id. In addition, the
3
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The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution9
prohibits the federal government from depriving a person of life,
liberty and property without due process of law, and from taking
private property for public use without paying just compensation.
These same proscriptions apply to state government action by
way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 0
The land use cases often muddle these prohibitions together, but
constitutionally the prohibitions seem to include procedural due
process, substantive due process, and "takings law."
Procedural due process requires a normative and fair process
in enacting and implementing a regulatory system. " Substantive
due process assures that the regulatory system is reasonable and
not unduly burdensome on individuals.12 The Takings Clause ac-
knowledges that the government can take private property for
public use, but must pay just compensation to the landowner.' 3
The Takings Clause has become more complex than appears
on its surface. The clause patently covers situations where the
government affirmatively seizes or confiscates the land. The con-
fusion arises when the government does not overtly confiscate the
land in this fashion, but merely regulates it. The Court has held
that some regulations can rise to the level of being a de facto or
regulatory taking requiring the payment ofjust compensation de-
spite the lack of a physical seizure of the land.' 4 It is in drawing
the line between constitutional regulations and unconstitutional
regulatory takings that the current problem has arisen. The
Supreme Court has been unable to establish discernible criteria
for drawing this line, and has operated instead by considering a
system of nebulous, ad hoc factors.' 5
means employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and must not unduly oppress individuals. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. See Chicago B & QR.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). The Supreme
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states. Id. at 241.
11. LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 40-41.
12. See generally Looper-Friedman, Constitutional Rights as Property?: The
Supreme Court's Solution to the "Takings Issue", .15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 39-44
(1990).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The Court
in Pennsylvania Coal stated that "while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id.
15. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
In addition to the economic factors discussed in note 3, supra, the Court also
considers the character of the governmental action. Id.
4
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This Article starts from a basic presumption that land can no
longer be seen solely as an economic commodity, thus necessitat-
ing a change in the way land use is regulated. Whatever regula-
tory system is used to affect this change, it must satisfy current
constitutional decisional law, or nudge that decisional law only
gently in the direction of change. Part II discusses current consti-
tutional law regarding land use, though it will for convenience
sake, generally refer to it as "takings law." This Article does not
attempt to provide an in depth description or analysis of the cur-
rent state of the law. That has been done so well, by so many
others, that it need not be repeated here.' 6
Part III discusses some of the writings that provide the ideas
and nurturing for the regulatory system proposed herein. Part IV
proposes a land classification system that will pass scrutiny under
current land use constitutional parameters, but clearly promotes
change in those parameters. This system proposes that all land
be divided into one of three categories based on its environmen-
tal and cultural importance, and that the rules applied by courts
in reviewing cases in each category be different as well.
II. CURRENT LAND USE ANALYSIS
Despite declaring the takings area to be one of ad hoc deci-
sionmaking, the courts have developed criteria that are repeatedly
applied in these cases. Among the factors which the Court con-
siders are the character of the regulatory action, the total eco-
nomic loss caused by the action, and the extent of the
interference with the owner's reasonable investment-backed
expectations. 17
16. See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977);
Looper-Friedman, Constitutional Rights as Property?: The Supreme Court's Solution to
the "Takings Issue ", 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31 (1990); Humbach, Land and a New
Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339, 358 (1989); Kramer, When Does a Regulation
Become a Taking? The United States Supreme Court's Most Recent Pronouncements, 26
AM. Bus. L.J. 729 (1989); Shepard, Land Use Regulation in the Rehnquist Court: The
Fifth Amendment and Judicial Intervention, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 847 (1989); Lipsker
& Heldt, Regulatory Takings: A Contract Approach, 16 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 195
(1988); Sax, Property Rights in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Status Report, 7 U.C.L.A.J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 139 (1988); Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommoda-
tion Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1021 (1975); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV.
165 (1974); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149
(1971); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of 'Just Compensation Law", 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and
the Policy Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
17. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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Subsumed in the character of the regulatory action are two
concepts that receive much judicial attention in takings cases.
The first concept is whether the regulation constitutes a perma-
nent physical occupation of the land. 8 The second concept is
whether the regulation attempts to prevent a public harm (i.e.,
nuisance), which is a valid goal, or to bestow a public benefit,
which is not a valid goal. 19
In considering the total economic loss criterion, it is the al-
most universal judicial assumption that a regulation which de-
prives the landowner of all reasonable economic use is clearly a
taking. 20 The total economic loss criterion also provides room
for concluding that a regulatory taking may occur where the eco-
nomic loss is something less than total. 21
A. Police Power Analysis
Every takings analysis should begin, or more accurately be
preceded by, an examination of the validity of the regulation
under a police power (or substantive due process) analysis. To be
valid, a regulation must promote a public health, safety or welfare
interest, must substantially advance that police power interest and
must not be unduly burdensome upon individuals. 22
The sweep of the police power's public health, safety or wel-
fare justification for action is very broad. It is highly unlikely that
a thoughtful, reasonably supportable regulation will fail judicial
muster. 23 It was believed that in satisfying the second prong of
the test, proving a nexus or connection between the regulation
and the stated police power purpose was an equally easy bur-
den. 24 If a rational basis for the regulation could be shown, the
18. For a discussion of the Court's view of permanent physical occupations,
see infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text discussing Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
19. LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 77. A regulation
aimed at preventing a harm rather than conferring a community benefit will be
more readily subject to deferential judicial review. Id. The view has been
termed the "harm-benefit distinction."
20. Id. at 70.
21. Id. at 82. While there is authority for the proposition that not all eco-
nomically viable use must be denied, the burden of proving that the regulation
has deprived the landowner of substantially all economically viable use is a heavy
one to satisfy. Id.
22. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). This three-prong test of sub-
stantive due process has become known as the Lawton test.
23. Sax, Property Rights in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Status Report, 7 U.C.L.A.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 139, 145 (1988).
24. Id. at 143-44.
6
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nexus test was met.
A good argument can now be made that the rational basis
test no longer applies in the wake of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission.25 In that 1987 case, the Court, reviewing an agency
action for the existence of a regulatory taking, decided that the
agency's regulation must "substantially advance" the agency's
purpose to be a valid exercise of its police power. 26 There has
been wide-ranging debate about the meaning of the Nollan case in
response to the Court's apparent shift from a rational basis test to
a "substantial advancement" test.27 One author indicates that
Nollan is a blip on the judicial screen and will have little lasting
impact, 28 while another contends that the Court engaged in sub-
stantive due process review in Nollan.29 Still others argue that
Nollan establishes an intermediate scrutiny test for land use
cases.
30
The truth is that no one knows what standard, if any, the
Court intended to establish, and no one will know until it elabo-
rates on its Nollan decision. This author finds little justification
for applying an intermediate scrutiny test for land use cases while
applying a less onerous test for other economic-based regula-
tions. It is also unsettling to conclude that the Court will now
openly and routinely engage in substantive due process review of
land use cases, thereby admittedly second-guessing the legisla-
ture. It is comforting to conclude, as does one legal scholar,
Professor Sax, that Nollan is an aberration limited to its facts, and
nothing more. Sax contends that the Court, rather than establish-
ing a new nexus test, merely concluded that the agency in the case
had failed to show any connection at all between the regulation
and the stated police power purpose. 3 1
The final prong of the police power analysis is met by dem-
25. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
26. Id. at 834 (citing Agins v. Tiberon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
27. See Kramer, When Does a Regulation Become a Taking? The United States
Supreme Court's Most Recent Pronouncements, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 729 (1989); Looper-
Friedman, Constitutional Rights as Property ?: The Supreme Court's Solution to the "Tak-
ings Issue", 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31 (1990); Sax, Property Rights in the U.S.
Supreme Court: A Status Report, 7 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 139 (1988).
28. Sax, supra note 23, at 146. Professor Sax contends that the language of
Justice Scalia's opinion in Nollan suggests "that Nollan is basically an abuse of
authority case, rather than a new departure in property law." Id. at 144.
29. Looper-Friedman, supra note 12, at 48-49 (suggesting that test under
Nollan is essentially same as second prong of Lawton test, requiring that exercise
of police power be reasonably necessary for accomplishment of its purpose).
30. LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 75.
31. Sax, supra note 23, at 143-44. Indeed, Professor Sax advances the argu-
7
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onstrating that the regulation does not place a disproportionate
burden on the landowner. A burden is disproportionate if it sin-
gles out a particular landowner to bear what should be borne by
the community at large. 32 Courts often use a harm-benefit analy-
sis to decide the matter. 33 If the regulation is intended to prevent
the landowner from doing harm (engaging in a nuisance), the
burden will not be considered disproportionate. If the regulation
is aimed at securing a public benefit, a disproportionate burden is
placed on the individual landowner. No matter how often the
harm-benefit analysis is repeated by writers or used by courts, the
hazy, subjective line between preventing harm and securing a
benefit is no more reassuring than that between beauty and its
antagonist. It is notable also that the harm-benefit analysis is
used again as part of the ad hoc takings analysis criteria discussed
below.3 4
B. Current Takings Analysis
Once a regulation is acknowledged to be a legitimate exercise
of the police power, several ad hoc factors are used by courts in
framing their takings analyses. 35 Each of these factors is part of a
mysterious balancing process used by the Court in its review of
takings cases. Individual factors do not normally stand alone, but
are balanced with other factors to determine the takings answer. 36
1. Physical Invasion
If the court finds that the regulation constitutes a physical
invasion of the property, this physical invasion standing by itself
will lead to a finding that there has been a taking. A good illustra-
tion of this principle is provided by Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp. ,7 decided by the Court in 1982.
Teleprompter, operating under a government permit, pro-
posed to place, without compensation, a television cable wire and
ment that the Court may have seen the agency's reason for its actions as pretext
and mere "after-the-fact justification[]." Id at 144.
32. LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 77.
33. Id. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
34. Id. at 68. The harm-benefit test is one of several ad hoc factors that the
Court balances in its takings analysis. While it is useful in determining the char-
acter of the government's regulatory action, the distinction between harm pre-
vention and benefit extraction is seldom precise. Id.
35. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. See supra notes 15, 17 and accompanying
text.
36. LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 70.
37. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
8
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a one foot wide cable box on the rooftop of a building owned by
Loretto. In finding that there had been a regulatory taking, the
Court stated that a permanent physical occupation authorized by
the government is a taking without regard to the public interest it
may serve. 38 In light of the permanent nature of the invasion, the
Court did not require the balancing of the minor intrusion upon
Loretto's property rights against the relatively important public
interest of providing cable television to Manhattan.3 9
Though the physical invasion rule is said to be a per se rule,40
some uncertainty exists about what constitutes a physical inva-
sion. In Nollan,4 ' the Court acknowledged that a state agency can
require a landowner to grant a public easement across his beach-
front property as a condition for a building permit sought by the
landowner.42 If the Court is concerned about substantive differ-
ences between government invasions of private property rights
rather than procedural niceties, it is difficult to reconcile Nollan
with Teleprompter. Allowing the public continuous access to your
beachfront property certainly appears to be a greater physical in-
vasion than a cable box and wire on the roof of an urban building.
In terms of the degree of deprivation of property rights, it is ar-
guably not critical that the beachfront landowner requested a per-
mit and the Manhattan building owner did not, nor does it
provide analytical comfort that the Court found other grounds
(lack of nexus) for denying the public access easement in the
Nollan case.
2. Economic Loss
The economic loss factor arose from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,43 in which Justice Holmes noted that if the diminution in
value of the property caused by the regulation is too great, it will
constitute a taking.44 Today, courts generally agree that where a
regulation deprives the landowner of all reasonable use of the
38. Id. at 434-35.
39. Id.
40. LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 79. This per se rule
does not turn on whether the physical invasion is solely by the government or by
those authorized by the government or that the physical invasion is minimal. Id.
41. 483 U.S. at 836.
42. Id. at 836-37. The Court explained that such a condition is constitu-
tional if the condition is designed to accomplish a purpose that would be a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power and not a taking. Id.
43. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
44. Id. at 415. See supra note 14.
9
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property, a taking exists. 45 Little guidance has emanated from
the courts on what is a reasonable use versus one that is not, and
there is considerable disagreement on how much, short of total
diminution, must occur to create a taking. 46
In spite of these ambiguities, a few things can be stated about
the economic loss factor with some assurance. Courts rarely con-
sider economic loss in isolation, but rather relate it to the purpose
behind the challenged regulation.47 Second, courts measure the
degree of economic impact by examining the property as a whole
and not simply the portion regulated, 48 arguably unlike the
Pennsylvania Coal Court which separated surface and sub-surface
land rights.49 Third, the Supreme Court has indicated that dimi-
nution in value, or the economic loss factor, may not by itself
cause a court to reach the conclusion that a regulatory taking oc-
curred: it is a merely a factor for consideration. 50 Fourth, a re-
striction that "deprives the property owner of the most profitable
use of his property is not necessarily enough to establish" that a
taking has occurred.5 1 While these four conclusions offer some
foundation regarding the economic loss factor, a great deal of un-
certainty remains.
3. Reasonable Investment-backed Expectations
This factor first appeared in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City,52 and may be, depending on your reading of it, a
grand mystery, a partial repetition of the economic loss factor, or
45. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
295-97 (1981). In Hodel, the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1977 (Act)
was challenged as effecting a regulatory taking of property without just compen-
sation because certain mining operations would no longer be financially viable.
The Court, however, found that the Act did not "prevent beneficial use of coal-
bearing lands." Id.
46. LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 82.
47. Looper-Friedman, supra note 12, at 45.
48. LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 69.
49. Looper-Friedman, supra note 12, at 45.
50. LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 82.
51. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
The Court noted that the question whether or not a regulation amounts to a
constitutional taking is one that properly turns on the particular circumstances
in each case. Id. at 168. The loss of a profitable use therefore would be consid-
ered in addition to other relevant factors. Id. See supra notes 3, 14 & 15 and
accompanying text for these factors.
52. 438 U.S. 124, 127-28 (1978). The Court explained, citing Pennsylvania
Coal, that a regulation that substantially furthers important public policies may
frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations so as to amount to a taking.
Id. at 127.
10
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a simple and obvious concept. Along the lines of the last possibil-
ity, the courts, in considering a landowner's reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations, may seek to divine whether he was
aware of the regulation prior to making substantial and reason-
able investments in the land. 53 If the landowner was unaware or
was given no notice by the regulator, the regulation may consti-
tute a taking under the concept of vested rights.54 For example, if
the government gave the landowner assurances that expensive
improvements being contemplated were legal and not objectiona-
ble, but changed its view after the improvements were made, this
action would interfere with the landowner's reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations.
No taking occurs where the regulation in question merely in-
terferes with "unilateral expectation or an abstract need" of the
landowner. 55 One would expect, though it is not entirely clear,
that a taking would not occur if a person merely owned the land
prior to the regulation, but did not undertake costly improve-
ments. It is even less clear as to how this factor is applied in the
situation where an investor buys land based on the hope or ex-
pectation of making a profit, and its plans are consistent with cur-
rent zoning and other land use regulations. If subsequently the
regulations are changed, thereby making the investor's plans ille-
gal, does that interfere with its reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations? Since it is ludicrous to expect that the Constitution
protects investors from interference with their speculative ven-
tures, one would anticipate that the answer is no.
If one concludes, as has one author, that reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations are limited to current uses of the land,
or to possible uses given the current condition of the land, then
arguing for protection of speculative uses of land would be of
minimal assistance to a complaining landowner. 56 Interpreted in
this fashion, this conclusion provides some fodder for the new
approach to takings analysis suggested in this Article.
4. Other Factors
Another factor of long-standing credibility in takings analy-
sis, discussed earlier under the police power section, is the dis-
53. LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 81.
54. Id.
55. Humbach, Land and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339, 358 (1989)
(quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckworth, 449 U.S. 155, 161
(1980)).
56. Id. at 362.
11
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tinction between a regulatory purpose to prevent a public
nuisance and one to provide a public benefit. 57 Whether a regula-
tion prevents a harm or confers a benefit is a determination en-
tirely within the discretion of the reviewing court. 58 Whether the
regulation's demand is that parkland be provided to get subdivi-
sion approval or that off-site roads be widened to support a pro-
posed shopping mall, it is the subjective judgment of the
decisionmaker whether that regulation prevents a harm or con-
fers a benefit. One can argue it forcefully either way.
If a court concludes that a regulation is intended to prevent a
public harm, it will usually uphold the regulation regardless of the
reduction in property value caused by it.59 In addition, the harm-
benefit approach provides courts with a framework for consider-
ing non-economic factors in the takings analysis, thus avoiding a
shortcoming present in current takings analysis. 60
The regulatory takings area is notorious for its ambiguity. It
is ill-perceived by many because notwithstanding the ambiguities,
the analysis is one founded wholly on economic factors. This is a
luxury the planet can no longer afford. 61
The need for clarity and change in the area is further drama-
tized by the Court's recent decisions on the issue of "ripeness."
The Court has ruled that takings cases are not ripe for federal
court review until property owners have obtained a "final" deci-
sion from the regulating agency determining what use can be
made of the land, and have been denied all reasonable beneficial
use of their property by that agency. 62 If the Court adheres to
these ripeness constraints, the task of clarifying and applying con-
stitutional takings law will fall to the state courts. 63 Given the
minimal guidance currently available from the Court, the poten-
57. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
58. Hunter, supra note 4 at 358. Hunter suggests that "the traditional
harm/benefit analysis is malleable to the point of offering no real limits on legis-
lative or judicial value choices. Id.
59. Id. at 323-25.
60. Id. at 330. These factors included the following: what post-regulation
uses remained, the regulation's effect on the whole parcel, the property owner's
expectations, the arbitrariness of the governmental decision, and whether the
landowner received any reciprocal benefits. Id.
61. Id. at 382.
62. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985). Takings claims have also not been considered ripe by
courts until the landowner has sought compensation through the procedures of
the state. Id. at 194.
63. Mandelker & Berger, A Plea to Allow the Federal Courts to Clarify the Law of
Regulatory Takings, 42 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3, 4 (1990).
12
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tial for inviting further inconsistency is great. The need for clarity
and change has not gone unheeded in academe, however, and the
next section discusses some of its proposed changes.
III. SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE
TAKINGS DILEMMA
Though the courts, especially the United States Supreme
Court, have muddled along with ad hoc decisionmaking in takings
analysis, some writers have suggested a more systematic ap-
proach. One of the foremost authorities in the land use field,
Norman Williams, is not optimistic about the Court's working to-
ward a systematic solution on its own. He suggests that as of the
late 1980's, eight of the nine justices (excepting Stevens) did not
understand the complex land use issues, and exhibited no interest
in learning.64 It is likely, therefore, that the solution will come
from the state courts, perhaps using one or more of the ideas sug-
gested by academics, including those discussed below.65
A. Regulatory Takings Are Rare
This may be a slight overstatement, but in a recent review of
the current state of takings law, Professor Joseph Sax suggests
that the debate about the appropriate analysis is much adieu about
very little. 66 He rejects the notion that the trilogy of 1987
Supreme Court cases has turned the area on its legal ear. He con-
tends that Nollan is an extreme case because there was no legiti-
mate showing of a connection between the state interest and the
condition in the permit67 and that Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. De Benedictis68 is a peripheral, poorly reasoned case
which is primarily the product of the Court's reluctance to over-
64. LAND USE AND THE CONSTITrrION, supra note 6, at 91. Williams notes
that the "long, rich state experience in the land use field has not been reflected
in Supreme Court opinions, thus reflecting the Court's lack of interest in this
area." Id.
65. As noted above however, leaving the task of deciding constitutional tak-
ings claims to the state courts under the Court's present fact-sensitive analysis
involves its own problems of inconsistency and insufficient guidance. See supra
note 63 and accompanying text.
66. Sax, supra note 23, at 145-46.
67. Id. at 143-44.
68. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania law
prohibiting coal mining that would result in subsidence beneath certain struc-
tures. The regulation affected approximately 2 percent of the existing coal. A 5
to 4 majority sustained the law as necessary to protect the public interest in
health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area. Id. at 487-88.
13
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turn the Pennsylvania Coal6 9 case. 70 In addition, Professor Sax
does not find troubling the Court's decision in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,7 1 declaring that
just compensation is due a landowner for temporary regulatory
takings, since there are few instances where a landowner actually
loses all economic use of the land.72
Sax argues that one cannot find a single modern case in
which the Court held a legislatively-enacted regulatory scheme to
be a taking. 73 He does identify, however, cases where a taking
was found through judicially decision-such as the physical inva-
sion cases (Teleprompter74 and Nollan 75 ), and a few cases where the
means greatly exceeded the legislative goal (Hodel v. Irving7 6 ). 7 7
Based on this record, Sax contends that the Court is no less likely
to approve a regulatory scheme today than it was in 1954 when it
wrote the Berman v. Parker78 opinion, 79 establishing the legitimacy
of regulations based on the broad concept of "public welfare." 80
In support of his position he cites a number of broad regulatory
schemes found to be legitimate in recent years-such as open
space zoning (Agins v. City of Tiburon"'), billboard regulation (Me-
tromedia v. City of San Diego82 ), wetland protection (United States v.
69. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 393. See supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
70. Sax, supra note 23, at 144-45.
71. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). The Court in First English considered the constitu-
tionality of an interim flood plain ordinance prohibiting rebuilding on the claim-
ant's land. While the Court remanded the question of whether the regulation
constituted a taking, it held that a landowner would be entitled to just compen-
sation for the loss incurred between enactment and invalidation of an unconsti-
tutional law if the regulation was a taking. Id. at 320.
72. Sax, supra note 23, at 145.
73. Id.
74. Teleprompter, 458 U.S. at 419.
75. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825.
76. 481 U.S. 704 (1987). Legislation enacted to abolish fragmentary inter-
ests in Indian land allotments effectively forfeited interests when other means
might have permitted owners to benefit without infringing on the legislative pur-
pose. Id. at 718.
77. Sax, supra note 23, at 145.
78. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
79. Sax, supra note 23, at 146.
80. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 26. The Court held that "[tihe concept of
the public welfare is broad and inclusive." Id. at 33. Given this sweeping defer-
ence to determinations of public welfare, Professor Sax notes that except in situ-
ations that are "utterly" lacking in justification, the Court is likely to accept
legislative goals in taking cases. See Sax, supra note 23, at 146.
81. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
82. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
14
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Riverside Bayview Homes8 3), historic preservation (Penn Central84),
pesticide regulation (Ruchelshaus v. Monsanto85 ), endangered spe-
cies (Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill8 6), and strip mine land restora-
tion (Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass 'n 87). 88 He
finds further support for the Court's hands-off approach in two
non-land use cases involving a rent control scheme (Pennell v. City
of San Jose89), and a pension protection law (Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp.90).
Given the limited holdings and deferential approach exhib-
ited in the Court's recent opinions, Professor Sax's argument
seems persuasive. The unsettling impact of these decisions, how-
ever, is that the important area of constitutional takings law is left
to the whim of ad hoc decisionmaking. In addition, the possibility
that the state courts may now be the important judicial players in
the takings game, due to recent interpretations of the "ripeness
doctrine," 9 1 reinforces the need for a unifying theme.92
For purposes of this Article the strength of Professor Sax's
argument lies in his conclusion that a regulatory system, albeit
broad and innovative, is unlikely to be labelled a regulatory taking
by the Court. If enacted in a planned fashion and supplied with a
sound public purpose rationale, the broad regulatory system pro-
posed in this Article is likely to withstand judicial scrutiny.
B. Substantive Due Process
Professor Susan Looper-Friedman argues that recent case
law, except for First English, appears to fit neatly into a substantive
83. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
84. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
85. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
86. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
87. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
88. Sax, supra note 23, at 146.
89. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
90. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
91. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
92. If takings law has not changed much over recent years, perhaps Sax has.
In a 1964 article, he suggested a theory called enterprise arbitration to resolve
the area's uncertainty. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
He argues that when the government seeks to enhance its resource position, it is
acting in its enterprise capacity and must pay just compensation. Id. at 63. Con-
versely, if the government is regulating to arbitrate or avoid private disputes
(e.g., zoning to separate conflicting uses), it is acting in its arbitral capacity and
owes no compensation regardless of the degree of private harm. The difficulty
with Sax's theory is similar to that discussed previously regarding the harm-
benefit distinction. Id. See supra, note 32 and accompanying text. It is very diffi-
cult to draw the line between the governments enterprise and arbitral activities.
15
Karp: An Alternative to the United States Supreme Court's Economic-Base
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
268 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. II: p. 253
due process analysis. 93 Although First English focuses on the ap-
propriate remedy when a temporary taking is found, the other
cases, argues Looper-Friedman, are not based on a takings claim,
regardless of the Court's insistence on classifying them as such.
She suggests that the error is a compounding of Justice Holmes
refusal in Pennsylvania Coal to discuss substantive due process with
his metaphorical use of the word "taking." 94
Looper-Friedman uses the three prong test from Lawton v.
Steele95 for substantive due process analysis and neatly puts each
of the recent Court cases onto one of the prongs. 96 As explained
earlier, the Lawton test requires that the state regulation must ad-
vance the interest of the public rather than any particular class of
persons, the means used must be reasonably necessary to attain-
ing the public goal, and the means must not unduly burden the
regulated individual. 97 She contends that because the so-called
takings cases can be explained under the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the question of whether a
government regulation can ever violate the Fifth Amendment's
takings clause is wholly unaddressed.
Looper-Friedman's article seems to suggest that we may not
have "progressed" at all from the pre-Pennsylvania Coal 98 days.
The current case law may be consistent with the nineteenth cen-
tury Mugler v. Kansas 99 decision, which held that if procedural and
substantive due process protections are accorded by the govern-
ment, the regulation is valid without regard to the Takings
Clause. The Court, despite its takings verbiage, has been silent
on the point.
A substantive due process pigeon-hole would provide the
currently labelled takings cases with an analytical framework su-
perior to ad hoc decisionmaking. However, one wonders if it is
realistic at this late date to expect the Court to recognize that for
93. Looper-Friedman, supra note 12, at 56-57.
94. Id. at 39-44. Looper-Friedman states that some commentators have
suggested that Justice Holmes' discussion of a "taking" in Pennsylvania Coal was
not intended to refer to the Takings Clause at all. Id. at 42. Instead, it is be-
lieved that Justice Holmes employed the word "taking" only in a metaphorical
sense in his attempt to avoid a discussion of substantive due process. Id.
95. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
96. Looper-Friedman, supra note 12, at 42-49.
97. Lawton, 152 U.S. at 137. According to Looper-Friedman, this three-
prong test essentially requires the following: (1) the end must be a proper one;
(2) the means must be appropriate; and (3) the end must justify the means.
Looper-Friedman, supra note 12, at 42 (emphasis in the original).
98. Looper-Friedman, supra note 12, at 62.
99. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
16
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the past seventy years it has been metaphorically distracted
by Justice Holmes' reluctance in Pennsylvania Coal to use the
words "substantive due process."' 00  In any event, Professor
Looper-Friedman provides a credible rationale for explaining the
prior "takings" cases that would allow the courts to move on to a
new Takings Clause analysis without offending traditions of stare
decisis. In this way, a fresh judicial approach for the Takings
Clause would enhance the acceptability of any regulatory system
proposed to end the confusion in the area.
C. Existing Use Preference
Professor John Humbach contends that the current land
ethic is one of autonomy and change.' 0 ' No other society appears
to have left the fate of its land so completely in the hands of
private owners. 10 2 He recognizes, however, that the public atti-
tude toward relatively unfettered land development is changing,
and development is often greeted with suspicion and hostility.
Humbach urges a new land ethic based on planning and
stability.' 03
The ethic of planning and stability would be attained through
a change in current zoning laws. Traditional zoning serves the
goal of consolidating like uses and separating incompatible ones;
zoning has not been used, however, to steer development away
from undeveloped areas entirely. 0 4 Humbach advocates creating
existing use zones, in which the current use to which the land is natu-
rally adapted would be viewed as the appropriate use of that
land. 10 5 The existing use zones are not appropriate for urban
100. Id. at 668-69. The Court stated, "[a] prohibition simply upon the use
of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to
the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be
deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit." Id.
101. Humbach, supra note 55, at 341. Humbach states that this ethic no
longer produces the best results and is being replaced by a new, emerging land
ethic. Id.
102. Id. at 342 n. 12 (quoting Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use?-
The Need for a New Conceptual Base for Land Use Policy, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759,
762 (1974)). As Caldwell explains, however, "[t]he present status of land own-
ership... is beneficial chiefly to developers and speculators .... [T]o the individ-
ual home owner mere ownership offers little more than an illusion of security."
Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use?-The Need for a New Conceptual Base
for Land Use Policy, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 767 (1974).
103. Humbach, supra note 55, at 341.
104. Id. at 349.
105. Id. Humbach explains that the creation of existing use zones is neces-
sary to save familiar countryside and natural areas because we cannot rely on
individual initiatives to decide where our land is developed. Id.
17
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areas, but are best-suited for relatively undisturbed areas in which
the community wishes to prevent development. Thus, in the ex-
isting use zone the presumption would run against the modifica-
tion of the current land use.' 06
Humbach notes that although a government regulation can-
not take away "fundamental attributes of ownership,"10 7 the right
to develop land is not one of these fundamental attributes, as is
made clear in the Penn Central10 8 case. 10 9 What the Takings
Clause guarantees is compensation for the deprivation of a gain-
ful economic return from the land. Land which is used, or capa-
ble of being used, for traditional activities such as farming,
ranching or forestry should easily meet the standard of providing
a gainful economic return."10 A regulation protecting these ex-
isting uses would have a deflationary impact on land prices, and
might deprive owners and investors of their opportunity for a
speculative profit. The constitution does not, however, guarantee
the right to develop or assure the right to make a speculative
profit on the sale of property."'
Humbach argues that existing use zoning is consistent with
the ad hoc factors considered by the Court in takings cases. First,
it does not physically invade the land. In addition, it causes no
economic loss, because the landowner can continue to make the
same use of the property as was made in the past. 12 Although
the legally unprotected speculative profit may be lost, the reason-
able investment-backed expectation of the investor or landowner
should take into account the fact that regulatory change is nor-
mal. Landowners are not immune to changes in regulation affect-
ing their land investment until such time as they obtain vested
rights through expenditures based upon an actual, approved de-
velopment plan.' i3
This author strongly agrees with Humbach that a new land
106. Id. at 349-50.
107. Id. at 351. Such attributes include the right to exclude others. Id. at
351 n.36.
108. 438 U.S. at 124 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)
("Government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law")).
109. Humbach, supra note 55, at 352.
110. Id. at 360.
111. Id. at 360-62. The fact that the owner could make a greater profit by
developing the land is not dispositive under a Takings Clause analysis. Id. at
360.
112. Id. at 363.
113. Humbach, supra note 55, at 368. An expectation that there will be no
18
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ethic which promotes planning and stability is necessary. The use
of existing use zoning has a great deal of appeal and promise for
accomplishing that end. One potential drawback, however, is that
existing use zoning may be misused by communities for the pur-
pose of maintaining the status quo, without having the sound land
ethic underpinnings for doing so. It is Humbach's stated inten-
tion, and should be each community's as well, that the critical
question in existing use zoning is where, not whether, development
should take place." 14 The discussion in the next section attempts
to go one step further in the development of a new land ethic by
establishing some parameters for deciding which lands should
not be developed.
D. Natural Use Theory
Mr. David Hunter combines principles of ecology with the
natural use theory emanating from the landmark Wisconsin case,
Just v. Marinette County.' 1 5 He proposes, as does Humbach, a new
land ethic. 1 6 Referring to the basic principles of ecology, he
points out that land, like the air and the water, is a critical ecologi-
cal resource. Land is a finite resource intricately tied to an array
of natural systems."i 7 As a result, Hunter argues that land should
not be perceived or legally regulated on a parcel-by-parcel basis.
This fundamental difference between land and other forms of
economic property 18 prohibits traditional decisionmaking's bal-
ancing of the public interest, as determined by society's value
choices, against fundamental property rights of individual land-
owners. Creating an ethic favoring the protection of land, says
Hunter, is not a matter of social value choices, but is one com-
pelled by the essential role land plays in ecological systems. It is a
regulatory change between purchase and actual development of land is simply
not a reasonable "investment-backed" expectation. Id.
114. Id. at 342.
115. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
116. Hunter, supra note 4, at 317-20.
117. Id. at 313-17. Hunter notes that recent environmental crises, such as
the pesticide scare of the 1960's, the oil crisis of the 1970's, and the current
deterioration of the ozone layer are "vivid example[s]" of the "complex, unpre-
dictable and potentially catastrophic effects posed by our own disregard of the
environmental limits to economic growth." Id. at 314. The finiteness, added to
human dependency on the environment, points to the "unquestionable result"
that human activities will have to be constrained. Id.
118. Id. at 318. Hunter suggests that land cannot be viewed as existing in
isolated parcels because a landowner's obligations cannot be limited to the
property boundaries. Id.
19
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matter of ecological imperative." 9 Protection of ecologically im-
portant lands is as basic to survival as maintaining breathable air
and potable water. Landowners must, therefore, come to under-
stand that along with the assortment of rights that accompany
land ownership comes the duty to be a steward of the land.' 20
Humbach writes of a land ethic changing from one preferring
change and development to one emphasizing planning and stabil-
ity. 121 Similarly, Hunter writes of a perspective changing from
one favoring unchecked growth and development to one en-
trenched in stewardship and conservation. 22
Hunter finds a legal haven for his adaptation of land ecology
principles to land use regulation in Just v. Marinette County. 12 3 In
this case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld a county shore-
land zoning ordinance that severely restricted the development of
wetlands contiguous to protected streams. 124 The court acknowl-
edged the interrelationship between the wetlands and other
shorelands with the purity of the water and other natural re-
sources, such as the opportunity to fish or to observe scenic
beauty.' 25 As a result, the court held that an owner of land "has
no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural
character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was
unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of
others."1 26
Humbach similarly pointed out that although there is a pro-
tected right to reasonable economic use of land, there is no con-
119. Id. at 314-15.
120. Hunter, supra note 4, at 319. According to Hunter, the key concept of
the land ethic is the idea of stewardship. Id. He provides the following:
Stewardship. . .refers to management, a management which uses no
more of the available resources than needed .... which does not allow
damage to go unattended. . . , which includes a proper dominion....
and which looks out for others' needs.... Wealth, power, or resources
are held in trust and include serious social responsibilities.
Id. at 319 (quoting A. FRITSCH, SCIENCE ACTION COALITION, WITH A. FRITSCH,
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: CHOICES FOR CONCERNED CITIZENS, 248 (1980)).
121. Humbach, supra note 55, at 341. See supra notes 101-02 and accompa-
nying text.
122. Hunter, supra note 4, at 319-20.
123. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
124. Id. at 26, 201 N.W.2d at 772.
125. Id. at 16-17, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
126. Id. at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768. The court stated that the exercise of the
police power must reflect the protection of the natural uses of the land. "[W]e
think it is not an unreasonable exercise of that power to prevent harm to public
rights by limiting the use of private property to its natural uses." Id. -
20
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stitutional right of development.' 27 The court in Just states that
the reasonable economic use of the land may be confined to that
which is consistent with the natural character of the land. 28
Hunter goes one step further in proposing that where the nature
of the land is such that its protection is an ecological imperative,
any reasonable economic use must be balanced against the duty
of stewardship. ' 29
Hunter states that the foremost impediment to the protection
of ecologically important lands is the current interpretation of the
Takings Clause as focusing only on economic rights associated
with land.' 30 He proposes that the federal navigational servi-
tude' 3' and the public trust doctrine 32 be expanded and used as
the legal vehicles for incorporating the principles of protecting
ecologically imperative lands into the current land use ethic.' s3
The recognition of some lands as critical natural resources
subject to the concept of stewardship, as proposed by Hunter, is
an essential ingredient to the change needed in takings law and in
land development regulation in general. The use of existing legal
doctrines, like the navigational servitude and public trust doc-
trines, is a tried and traditional method of changing outmoded
legal doctrine. This author, employing the ideas of Hunter and
the other authors discussed in this section, will propose a differ-
ent solution.
127. Humbach, supra note 55, at 352. See supra note 109 and accompanying
text.
128. Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768. See supra note 126 and ac-
companying text.
129. Hunter, supra note 4, at 358-59.
130. Id. at 316.
131. Id. at 360. The federal navigational servitude doctrine vests property
rights in navigable waters with the United States under a general commerce
power source of authority. Id. Hunter explains that the doctrine basically is "an
interest which permits the federal government to displace or destroy state-rec-
ognized property rights in navigable waters ... without having to pay just com-
pensation." Id. For a brief explanation of Hunter's proposed expansion of the
doctrine, see infra note 133 and accompanying text.
132. Id. at 367. The public trust doctrine allows states to avoid constitu-
tional takings claims when they are merely fulfilling their obligations as trustees
of the public's interest in private lands, especially property underlying navigable
waters. Id.
133. Hunter, supra note 4, at 360-78. Generally, Hunter argues that expan-
sions of these two doctrines would act as effective alternatives to the traditional
takings doctrine and would instead reconcile takings analysis with ecological
principles. Id. at 367-78.
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IV. ANOTHER PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
A change in the law of takings is necessary for several rea-
sons. The landowner, the government regulator, and the planet
are not benefitted by an ad hoc decisionmaking system that is
more akin to roulette than law-making. Some degree of certainty,
even if not ideal from the perspective of any of the various indi-
vidual interests, is better than the proverbial "shot in the dark."
As always, the function of the regulator initially, and the courts
ultimately, is to balance the public interest against the private in-
terest. The key is to determine which is the weightier concern;
the landowner's economic interest in land as both a commodity
and factor of production, or society's natural resource interest.
While some degree of uncertainty is intrinsic in any social balanc-
ing process, a significant amount of doubt can be eliminated.
As mentioned previously, land is different from other forms
of property, and must be treated differently. It plays a critical role
in forming the base of the ecological pyramid.' 3 4 Because not all
land plays a critical ecological role, the law should differentiate be-
tween types of land. Lands, important to the earth ecosystem or
life on the planet, must have their natural resource value empha-
sized whereas the private economic interest of the landowner
must be de-emphasized. Courts have long held that private prop-
erty owners cannot expect to cut the public off from access to the
sea and other important navigable waters.' 35 It is equally, if not
more, unacceptable for private landowners to expect to use their
lands in a fashion that threatens life on the planet, or even signifi-
cantly degrades the quality of human life in their communities.
If it is accepted that some degree of certainty is better than
ambiguity in takings law, that life interests supersede private
property interest, and that these concepts are not assured by the
current law, then the takings law must change. In light of the un-
usually slow and cumbersome nature of affecting social change
through case by case judicial decisionmaking and the rapid rate of
depletion of important ecotypes, a comprehensive legislative sys-
tem of change is preferable, even necessary. What this Article
proposes is first, a skeleton for a comprehensive regulatory
scheme that should survive analysis under current takings law,
134. Id. at 336.
135. Id. at 360-61. Hunter notes that historically, the federal government
has been vested with the right to regulate navigable waters and the underlying
land, thereby denying private property interests. Id. at 360.
22
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and second, a shift away from purely economic analysis in takings
cases.
A. Threads from Prior Writers
Amidst the great amount of writing on the takings issue,' 36
the works of a few writers have been singled out for attention in
this Article because they each provide a building block for the
proposal made herein. Before setting forth this proposal, a brief
summary of these authors' views is necessary.
Professor Sax carefully documents that where the govern-
ment has adopted a comprehensive regulatory scheme, it is rare,
except in narrow circumstances, for the Court to find that a taking
has occurred.' 37 To secure the right of passage through the
shoals of takings law, communities should adopt a comprehensive
regulatory scheme and carefully justify the reason for such a
scheme. If all communities enacted regulatory schemes with
common ingredients, the new norm would minimize takings dis-
putes, planetary anguish, and bad land investments.
If significant change in takings law is going to take place,
courts must ultimately play a role. Judicial respect for stare deci-
sis must be recognized. Courts are usually reluctant to adopt a
new position unless it can be reconciled with their prior rulings in
such a way as to give the appearance of consistency. Professor
Looper-Friedman asserts that the so-called takings cases can all
be explained as substantive due process cases, 138 or arguably as
cases simply reviewing the validity of the exercise of the police
power. Though there may be judicial cringing in some quarters
about acknowledging that they have engaged in an inquiry into
the wisdom of the law, in reality it is done in the highest judicial
echelons. 139 A consistent rationale is, therefore, available for
prior "takings" rulings, freeing the courts to travel a different
path.
Professor Humbach also provides important underpinnings
for the legal changes proposed herein. He claims the roulette-
like takings law, and the roulette-like freedom given the market
place to steer development must end. His goals of planning and
136. See supra note 16.
137. Sax, supra note 23, at 145. For examples of these comprehensive regu-
latory schemes, see supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
138. Looper-Friedman, supra note 12, at 44-49. See supra notes 93-98 and
accompanying text.
139. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838-39.
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stability give rise to a presumption favoring the existing use of
land, at least for ecologically or community-determined critical
areas. 140 Equally important is his point that there is no constitu-
tionally protected right to develop land, and that if the land can
be bought and sold in the open market, it must have some value
and therefore some reasonable use.' 4 ' Even if one retains the
current economics-based analysis, Humbach capably makes the
case for protecting important lands. 142 If, however, one rejects
the use of economics-based analysis commonly applied through-
out the land use field, the case for protecting ecologically valuable
lands can be more easily made.
Mr. Hunter established that all land is not equal, and cannot
be treated as if it is. He notes that the finite nature of land and its
intricate role in the many life support systems make it a type of
property that needs to be subdivided before regulation. 143 Eco-
logically important lands give rise to the duty of being a steward
of that land, thereby limiting the rights that may otherwise exist
with property ownership. In the long run, a new land ethic must
arise among landowners; but in the nearer term, the law must
change to foster the growth of that new land ethic.
B. - A New Regulatory Scheme
Ideally each state should undertake, or require its individual
communities to undertake a systematic study leading to a state-
wide comprehensive land use plan. A classification system for
land throughout the state would be a major part of that plan.
Though the land classification system can be developed outside a
broad comprehensive plan, and may for political reasons have to
be, the preparation of the classification system as a part of a com-
prehensive regulatory system will probably eliminate the threat of
a constitutional challenge to the regulatory scheme as a taking
without just compensation. Several states, such as Oregon,' 44
have already developed such plans, and others are in the
process. 145
140. Humbach, supra note 55, at 350.
141. Id. at 351.
142. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
143. Hunter, supra note 4, at 314. See supra note 117 and accompanying
text.
144. See, De Grove & Stroud, State Land Planning and Regulation: Innovative
Roles in the 1980s and Beyond, 39 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3, 7-8 (1987).
145. J. DEGROVE AND N. STROUD, 1989 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HAND-
BOOK 55-58 (1989).
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All land should be divided into three classes: ecologically im-
perative lands,' 46 community-critical lands, and economic-pri-
macy -lands. The ecologically imperative lands, as described by
Hunter, play a vital role in protecting life systems, and their im-
portance is scientifically verifiable. In large measure the lands are
placed in this category based on scientific data and not on the
social values of the regulator or its constituency. It would be
naive to think these simple declaratory statements sweep away all
ambiguity. There are various levels of evidence available at any
point in time proving a scientific fact, so the category may expand
or contract as scientific evidence becomes available. The ultimate
decision to include or exclude lands from the ecologically impera-
tive class based on such scientific evidence must lie with govern-
ment. Given the degree of restriction to be placed on owners of
this land, the decision as to the type of lands put into this classifi-
cation should be made at the state level.
It may be impertinent for this author, who does not have a
science background, to propose the types of land that might be
classified as ecologically imperative. The temptation to do so,
however, is overwhelming. Serious consideration must be given
to wetlands, prime agricultural lands (essential human habitat),
lands that protect water supplies (streams and aquifers essential
for human and other life to survive), tropical forests (essential to
the quality of the air supply), the critical habitat of non-human
species, and lands essential for maintaining biological diversity.
Coastal areas and riparian forests may be included as well, if not
already covered by the above list. The United States government
and some of the states have already adopted a "no net loss of
wetlands" policy, perhaps making wetlands an unchallenged en-
trant into the category. 1 4 7 These lands would be identified and
mapped, akin to wetlands mapping done in some states, so that
the public may become aware of the location of protected lands.
The restriction on the use of ecologically imperative lands is
simply that no development is permitted that would interfere with
the natural resource role played by the land. In short, the natural
resource value of these lands would have primacy, and their com-
modity value would be minimized. An exception might be cre-
ated for the landowner who can prove an extraordinary
justification; an onerous burden that would be satisfied by proof
146. The term was coined by D. Hunter, supra note 4, at 316.
147. Wetlands: EPA Endorses No-Net-Loss Wetlands Goal, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1907 (Jan. 27, 1989).
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that a compelling private interest outweighs the public interest.
This exception would not be a loophole for returning to an eco-
nomic-based ethic, and an economic justification alone would
rarely, if ever, satisfy the burden of proof. Long-term survival
and short-term prudence dictate that economic considerations
are irrelevant in preserving ecologically important lands.
The second category of land is community-critical areas.
These lands are necessary to protect the quality of human life.
They are not scientifically essential to earth's life support systems,
but they have special importance to the state, region or commu-
nity. The decision to include lands in the community-critical cate-
gory would be made by the state or local government based upon
pre-determined criteria.
Lands included in the community-critical category might be
any of the potentially ecologically imperative lands mentioned
above which do not meet the scientific threshold for inclusion in
that category. Other candidates include scenic vistas, historic
landmarks, and open space needed to prevent congestion. The
lands in this category would also be inventoried and mapped to
minimize public uncertainty and conflict.
The restriction on community-critical lands would reflect an
administrative, legislative and judicial presumption favoring per-
petuation of the existing use. As with the prior category no re-
striction on development is imposed, except that which is
necessary to protect its community-critical purpose. Because
there is a presumption favoring the existing use, the private inter-
est must substantially outweigh the public interest to justify devel-
opment which would reduce or destroy the community-critical
purpose. The natural resource and community value of these
lands would be considered more important than its economic-
commodity value.
Some communities may believe that the burden on commu-
nity-critical lands-but not ecologically imperative lands-created
by this type of regulation may be too onerous for landowners to
bear. The impact on individual landowners may be reduced by
such devices as reduced property taxes, transferable development
rights, and paid acquisition of conservation easements. Arguably,
the decision to provide some form of compensation should be
based upon the concept of fairness within the Due Process
Clause, and not on the need to pay just compensation under the
Takings Clause.
The third category of lands, economic-commodity lands,
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would include all other lands. Regulation of these lands would
not differ from the current system of regulation. With ecologi-
cally imperative lands and community-critical lands removed
from the overall land pool, however, much less strain and anxiety
would be created by the ad hoc takings rules currently in place,
since much of the current litigation centers around protecting
ecological values and community quality of life values. Many of
the regulatory schemes aimed at protecting wetlands, farmland,
coastal areas and the like, would be handled within the first two
categories of land.
C. Justification for the New System
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that a person cannot be deprived of property without due
process of law, and that private property cannot be taken for pub-
lic use unless just compensation is paid. The intent of the Due
Process Clause and the Takings Clause is to prevent the govern-
ment from depriving individuals of property rights arbitrarily.
The creation of a comprehensive regulatory system for land use
would further this goal of eliminating arbitrary governmental
conduct.
1. Due Process
If the government conforms to the standards of procedural
due process in enacting the regulations, it assures fair treatment
as to legal process. If the government carefully establishes the
public purpose to be served by the regulations, and makes the
connection between the purpose and regulatory scheme, the en-
actment will constitute a valid exercise of the police power. Pro-
tecting ecologically imperative lands that aid in maintaining life
support systems and community critical lands that facilitate the
quality of human life is clearly a valid regulatory purpose.
Preventing development where it is likely to destroy the public
purpose which the lands serve is the substantial connection be-
tween the end and means of the regulation.
Even if there is an otherwise valid exercise of the police
power, substantive due process requires that the regulatory sys-
tem not unduly burden the private landowner. 148 Under the pro-
posed regulatory system, the landowner is free to make any use or
undertake any development so long as that use or development
148. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. at 133.
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does not interfere with the ecological imperative or community-
critical value of the land. Nevertheless, the restriction on devel-
opment may greatly reduce the investment value of the land.
Though the speculative investment value placed on the land by
the owner may be sharply curtailed, the regulatory system does
not reduce the value of the land in its existing state. A person
may invest in stocks, bonds, gold, silver or land in the hope or
speculative expectation that those assets will increase in value,
but neither the market system nor the law guarantees that en-
hancement. In this way, a regulatory system that limits or even
eliminates that speculative gain, but leaves the land with its ex-
isting value, does not unduly burden the private landowner.
Perhaps the speculative investment value (i.e., the right to
develop) presumed to exist by American land investors, though
not rising to the level of a substantive legal right, does mandate
greater protection than the previous argument allows. However,
any economic fairness rights pale in the light of the purpose be-
hind the proposed regulatory system. The regulations are in part
intended to safeguard land that is essential to the survival of life
on the planet. That right to a viable planet is more fundamental
and more deeply entrenched than any entitlement to a profit from
a land investment. What good is profit without life? The fairness
argument weakens under these circumstances.
The fairness argument can be made in several other ways.
One can argue that the burden of the regulatory system falls more
heavily on those in the community who own ecologically impera-
tive and community-critical lands. One can hardly contest the ac-
curacy of the argument, but the yoke of any regulatory scheme
inevitably rests unevenly. This disproportionate burden is not ac-
cepted by the courts as a basis for striking regulations. 49 An an-
ecdote may serve to illustrate the point. DuPont invested millions
of dollars in developing and marketing chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) internationally. 150 DuPont and a few other companies
share a very lucrative market. Several years later it was discov-
ered that CFCs are the main culprit in reducing the earth's pro-
tective ozone shield. The continual reduction of the ozone layer
will have significant, perhaps catastrophic impact on human
health. If DuPont and its fellow manufacturers are required by
regulation to discontinue the production of CFCs, is that in a due
process sense unfair to DuPont, or a taking of their property with-
149. Santini v. Lyons, 448 A.2d 124, 126 (1982).
150. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1990, at Cl, col. 1.
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out just compensation? DuPont, and others similarly situated, are
not likely to seriously make these arguments. It is equally unrea-
sonable for a landowner to expect to develop lands in the face of
threats to the earth's or to a community's life support system.
As to ecologically imperative lands, the argument can be
made that the proposed regulations may place heavier burdens
on those living outside urban areas. Just as urbanites, by opting
to live in the city, have acquiesced in the heavier tax burden
placed on them for public safety, for example, their non-urbanite
brethren, by choosing to live outside the city, must assume the
weightier burden that some of their land may not be able to be
developed. Stated more positively, owners of these lands are en-
trusted with their stewardship and conservation.
One can argue that a comprehensive regulatory scheme may
be fair as to those who invest in land after the regulations are in
place, but not as to those who purchased under the former re-
gime relying on the historically reinforced notion that there is a
right to develop. The DuPont example again seems appropriate.
There were no regulations on the use of CFCs when DuPont in-
vested millions of dollars in their production and marketing. Yet,
it does not seem "fair" for DuPont, or in our case for individual
landowners, to continue to engage in activity that is life-threaten-
ing and poses a threat of substantial reduction in community wel-
fare. Furthermore, landowners cannot expect a status quo in land
use regulation. The history of this century has shown that there is
a continual evolution toward greater regulatory restraint on an
owner's freedom to use his land.
2. Regulatory Taking
The second constitutional proscription relevant to land use
cases is the Takings or Just Compensation Clause. Some of the
arguments made under the Due Process Clause are applicable to
the takings analysis as well. The discussion in this part, therefore,
will be confined to the ad hoc factors used by the Court in decid-
ing takings cases.
This proposed regulatory system in no way constitutes a
physical invasion of the land. All the fundamental attributes of
ownership-the rights to use, to exclude and to dispose of it-are
retained. The right of use may be limited to existing uses, or at
least to uses not invasive of the public interest underlying the reg-
ulatory system. Given the history of the Court, and given that no
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physical invasion exists, it is unlikely that the Court will find that a
taking has occurred.
The second factor considered by the courts is the economic
loss, or diminution in value element.' 5 ' Some courts have held
that a significant reduction in value may constitute a taking, but
the majority view is that all reasonable use must be taken.15 2 Us-
ing terms like "significant" and "reasonable" adds little guidance
as to where lines should be drawn. Courts rarely consider the
economic loss factor without taking into account the purpose be-
hind the regulation.' 5 3 The purpose served by the proposed reg-
ulatory scheme is to protect ecologically imperative and
community-critical lands. These purposes are lofty ones and
should withstand an enormous reduction in property value before
rising to the level of a regulatory taking. Even under the minority
rule which requires only a "significant" diminution in value, the
significance of the reduced development rights pales when com-
pared to the public purpose served.
If the regulatory system takes all or most of the development
rights from the landowner, reasonable use may still be retained.
A very effective argument can be made that using the land in a
manner consistent with its natural character is a reasonable use.
For example, if the landowner of a wetland is limited to using it
for wetland uses (e.g., fishing, hunting, birdwatching, nature
sanctuary, water retention area), then that is by its nature the
most effective use for that land. The wetlands have been
"honed" by the ecosystem for a millennia for just such a use.
The regulatory system proposed here clearly down-plays the
primacy of economic considerations with regard to ecologically
imperative, and to a lesser degree, community-critical lands.
Confining lands to their ecologically or community designated
purpose, however, does not eliminate the economic value of the
land. Wetlands and coastal lands, albeit rigidly regulated by state
law, continue to be bought and sold on the open-market, though
probably at reduced prices. As demonstrated above, a reasonable
use is not synonymous with development rights.
The third factor considered by the courts pertains to the rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations of the landowner. As
stated previously the precise nature of this factor is unclear.154 It
151. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
152. Looper-Friedman, supra note 12, at 45.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
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seems, however, that it is an attempt to prevent the government
from precluding development through regulation after the land-
owner has made a significant investment in undertaking the de-
velopment. Once the proposed regulatory system is in place,
landowners would be charged with knowledge of the limitations
placed on development by the system. Any investments made
subsequent to the adoption of the regulatory scheme would not
create reasonable investment-backed expectations.
As to those who purchased prior to the effective date of the
regulatory system, the currently prevailing state rule should ap-
ply. 155 No vested rights exist until the approval stage (e.g., build-
ing permit stage). If the land is of the ecologically imperative
type and the right to develop has vested, the government must
pay just compensation. 56
V. CONCLUSION
The legislatively enacted comprehensive regulatory system
proposed by this Article has the major advantage of adding clarity
to the area of the "constitution and land use." As demonstrated
above, this system of dividing land into three categories should
pass constitutional muster. In addition, the system puts
landowners on notice as to what is likely to be permitted on their
land and what is not. Most importantly, however, it begins the
crucial process of developing an ethic that views land as an essen-
tial element in the earth's life support system. It does not turn
away from the concept of growth, economic or otherwise, but
rather advocates environmentally sustainable growth. The op-
portunity to build a lasting foundation for our society will pass us
by if we do not seize it.157 "To get under way, we need only stop
resisting the push, and embrace the pull, of building a sustainable
society." 158
Perhaps it was best said by Aldo Leopold when he wrote, "[a]
land ethic, then, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience,
and this in turn reflects a conviction of individual responsibility
for the health of the land. Health is the capacity of the land for
155. LAND USE AND THE CONSTITION, supra note 6, at 81.
156. See Humbach, supra note 55, at 365-69.
157. L. BROWN, C. FLAVIN, S. PASTEL, STATE OF THE WORLD 1990, 190
(1990). As the goals of our materialistic society focus more and more on amas-
sing personal and natural wealth, it becomes more readily apparent that a move-
ment toward a lasting society depends on a transformation of these individual
priorities and values. Id.
158. Id.
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self-renewal. Conservation is our effort to understand and pre-
serve this capacity."' 59
159. A. LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at 258.
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